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INTRODUCTION 
Peter Bakeas, a thirty-three-year-old Greek citizen living in West 
Lynn, Massachusetts and working in an entry-level position at the 
First National Bank of Greece in Massachusetts, developed a cocaine 
habit he could not afford.1 Mounting debt from his cocaine habit 
pressured him to find alternative means for obtaining income. 
Bakeas, using his position at First National Bank of Greece, began to 
* I am deeply grateful for the support of my mother, Marilyn Bent, and the helpful 
comments of Jennifer Boatwright. 
1. The facts described in this paragraph are taken from United States v. Bakeas, 9f!:/ F. 
Supp. 44 (D. Mass. 1997). 
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embezzle money from the accounts of a distant relative and some 
family friends. When his scheme was discovered, he confessed and 
made arrangements to repay the money he had taken. Bakeas pled 
guilty to embezzlement by a bank officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
656.2 It was his first offense. Normally, under the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant convicted of this crime under 
these circumstances and with no criminal record would be sentenced 
to three years of probation, twelve months of which would be served 
in a community confinement center. A community confinement 
center is a minimum security facility that allows inmates a more 
normal life and more contact with the community than a typical 
prison. According to Federal Bureau of Prisons ("Bureau") policy, 
however, an alien like Bakeas would not have been placed in one of 
these community centers, but rather would have been placed in a 
medium security prison - a decidedly more punitive environment. In 
Bakeas's case, Judge Gertner, the sentencing judge, was aware of the 
Bureau's policy and decided to depart from the statutorily prescribed 
sentence. Judge Gertner instead imposed a sentence of three years 
probation, with ten months of home confinement, in which Bakeas 
could leave his apartment only for work, religious observance, or 
medical care. In doing so, Judge Gertner imposed a sentence that was 
similar to what a non-alien defendant would have received for the 
same crime. Did Judge Gertner have the discretion under the 
Sentencing Guidelines to make this decision? 
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ("Act") established the 
United States Sentencing Commission ("Commission") in order to 
compose and administer the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
("Guidelines"). The Guidelines are a complex punishment formula 
based on a number of factors relating to the crime and the criminal in­
volved.3 The Act represents an attempt by Congress to introduce a 
more uniform sentencing system for defendants convicted of federal 
crimes.4 Congress, however, anticipated that despite the need to pun­
ish criminals in a proportional and just fashion, it would be impossible 
to predict all of the relevant factors and circumstances that attend 
2. 18 U.S.C. § 656 {1994 and Supp. IV 1998). 
3. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 {codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-59, 3561-
66, 3571-74, 3581-86; 28 u.s.c. §§ 991-98 (1994)). 
4. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 52-5 3 (1983); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 
1, pt. A, at A3, p.s. (1998) [hereinafter "USSG"; all references are to the November 1998 
version unless otherwise indicated]; Michael S. Gelacak et al., Departures Under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines: An Empirical and Jurisprudential Analysis, 81 MINN. L. REV. 299, 
308 n.34 (1996) ("The Senate Committee characterized this reduction in disparity among 
similarly situated defendants as a 'primary goal of sentencing reform.' "). See generally 
Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 
U. cm. L. REV. 901 (1991). 
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each individual case.5 No formula, no matter how complex, could al­
ways arrive at the proper punishment range for every case. Recog­
nizing this, Congress expressly provided for departures from the pre­
scribed sentence, to be exercised at the discretion of the district court 
judge.6 
Departures from the Guidelines, however, must be relatively in­
frequent in order to attain the desired goals of a uniform system of 
punishment - if departures were the rule, and not the exception, the 
Guidelines would fail to reduce sentencing disparities. Consequently, 
the discretion of sentencing judges to depart has been limited, to some 
extent, by Congress7 and the Commission. A sentencing judge is ex­
pressly forbidden from considering factors, relating to the criminal or 
the crime itself, as a basis for a departure.8 Others are expressly men­
tioned as potential bases for departure.9 Still many other factors are 
5. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 52-53 (1983); Gelacek et al., supra note 4, at 301. 
6. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994). The text of section 3553(b) reads: 
The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range, referred to in subsection 
(a)(4) unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a 
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission 
in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described. 
The legislative history reveals that the departure provision was meant to account for cases 
that the Commission did not fully anticipate: 
[T]he provision provides the flexibility necessary to assure adequate consideration of cir­
cumstances that might justify a sentence outside the guidelines. A particular kind of circum­
stance, for example, might not have been considered by the sentencing commission at all be· 
cause of its rarity, or it might have been considered only in its usual form and not in the 
particularly extreme form present in a particular case. 
S. REP. No. 98-225, at 142 (1983). 
Although many departure factors, such as a voluntary confession, are connected to the 
moral blameworthiness of the defendant for the criminal act, some are not. The Guidelines 
explicitly recognize that a factor may justify a downward departure even though it has noth­
ing to do with moral blameworthiness. See infra note 42 and accompanying text. 
7. Congress's restrictive approach to departures is evident in the Sentencing Reform 
Act. First, Congress required judges to state in open court the reasons for a departure from 
the Guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) (1994). Additionally, Congress provided for ap­
pellate review of sentencing courts' decisions to depart. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1994). 
8. The complete list of forbidden bases for departure is: race, sex, national origin, creed, 
religion, socio-economic status, see USSG § 5Hl.10, p.s., lack of guidance as a youth, see 
USSG § 5Hl.12, p.s., drug or alcohol dependence, see USSG § 5Hl.4, p.s., and economic 
hardship, see USSG § 5K2.12. 
9. The explicitly mentioned bases for departure fall into two categories: encouraged 
and discouraged. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 94 (1996) [For a complete discus­
sion of the facts and holding in Koon, see infra Part II.]. Encouraged factors are those that 
the Commission explicitly recognized that it was unable to take into account adequately in 
formulating the Guidelines. See id. at 94. Although the presence of an encouraged factor 
does not always justify a departure, see id. at 94-95, this explicit recognition implies that the 
Commission expected such factors to lead to departures in many cases. Examples of en­
couraged bases for downward departure are: voluntary disclosure of the offense to authori­
ties, see USSG § 5K2.16, p.s., and diminished capacity, see USSG § 5K2.13, p.s. In contrast, 
discouraged factors are those that the Commission has determined are "not ordinarily rele­
vant to the determination of whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline 
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not mentioned in the Guidelines - either intentionally or because the 
drafters did not consider them.10 One unmentioned factor that some 
courts have considered as a basis for departure is the defendant's in­
eligibility for prerelease confinement programs due to the defendant's 
status as a deportable alien. Although the Guidelines forbid the use of 
race and national origin as a basis for departure,11 they do not mention 
the defendant's alienage, or the consequences of the defendant's 
status as an alien for confinement conditions.12 
Under Federal Bureau of Prisons policy, deportable aliens are 
generally ineligible for lower-security confinement programs, such as 
halfway houses, which give the prisoner greater freedom and the abil­
ity to carry on a more normal life.13 Presumably, the Bureau's policy is 
range." USSG ch. 5, pt. H, intro. cmt.; see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 95. The Guidelines in­
struct that discouraged factors are only relevant if "such characteristic or circumstance is 
present to an unusual degree and distinguishes the case from the 'heartland' cases covered 
by the guidelines." USSG § 5K2.0, p.s. The Guidelines define "heartland" as a "set of typi­
cal cases embodying the conduct that each guideline describes." See USSG ch. 1, pt. A, at 
4(b ). Examples of discouraged bases for downward departure are: family ties and responsi­
bilities, see USSG § 5Hl.6, p.s., and educational or vocational skills, see USSG § 5Hl.2. 
10. See USSG § 5K2.0, p.s. (noting that all the factors justifying departure could not be 
listed comprehensively and providing that unmentioned factors "may warrant departure 
from the guidelines, under some circumstances, in the discretion of the sentencing court."). 
11. See supra note 8. 
12 See United States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640, 644 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that 
"[n]ational origin, i.e., having been born in a particular country . . .  is not synonymous with 
'alienage,' i.e., simply not being a citizen of the country in which one is present." ); see also 
United States v. Smith, 27 F.3d 649, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (agreeing with the distinction used 
in Restrepo). 
13. The Federal Bureau of Prisons ("Bureau") is the executive agency responsible for 
assigning federal prisoners to specific confinement facilities. The Bureau makes decisions 
concerning the security level of incarceration and eligibility for lower security confinement, 
including prerelease programs. In doing so, the Bureau evaluates several factors, including 
the prisoner's escape history, behavior problems while incarcerated, and history of violence. 
See FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Program Statement 5100.07, 
ch. 7, at 4 (1999). Congress has instructed the Bureau of Prisons to ensure that most prison­
ers have the opportunity to spend the last portion of their sentences in Jower security con­
finement or in community confinement programs (halfway houses). See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) 
(1994). For the relevant text of section 3624(c), see infra text accompanying note 23. 
Halfway houses are privatized confinement facilities within the community that provide 
the inmate with the opportunity to be employed in the community and participate in other 
structured programs outside of the confinement facility. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
PRISONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Program Statement 7310.04 (1998). In accordance with 
Congress's instructions, the Bureau has made halfway houses widely available to federal in­
mates. Between October 1998 and September 1999, 74.7% of federal inmates released from 
prison were sent to halfway houses for the last portion of their sentences. See Telephone 
Interview with Jane Rhoades, Program Analyst, Bureau of Prisons (Mar. 17, 2000). The Bu­
reau, however, has set three requirements for a deportable alien to participate in these pre­
release programs, which make this opportunity essentially unavailable for aliens. Those re­
quirements include verified strong family ties in the United States, a verified history of 
domicile in the United States (five or more consecutive years), and a documented or verified 
history of stable employment in the United States. See BUREAU OF PRISONS, 5100.07, ch. 7, 
at 34; see also Smith, 27 F3d at 651 n.2 (noting that these requirements make it essentially 
impossible for aliens to qualify for prerelease programs). An alien who fails to meet these 
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based on the belief that an alien who knows he or she will be deported 
upon release from prison will be more likely to attempt an escape than 
other inmates.14 As a result of the Bureau's policy, deportable aliens 
often face objectively harsher confinement conditions than the aver­
age citizen defendant, all else being equal.15 Some courts have recog­
nized these harsher conditions of confinement and have, therefore, 
acknowledged alien status as a basis for a downward departure.16 For 
example, in United States v. Smith,11 the defendant, Renford George 
Smith, was a deportable alien convicted of unlawful possession of co­
caine base with intent to distribute.18 The district judge imposed the 
minimum sentence available in the sentencing range prescribed by the 
Sentencing Guidelines, given the relevant factors present in the case, 
but indicated that she would have liked to reduce the sentence even 
more.19 Although Smith argued that the court should depart down­
ward to reduce the sentence further, the judge declined to depart, 
stating: "I really don't see any basis for departure."20 On appeal, 
requirements will be denied access to these programs unless the requirements are either vol­
untarily waived by the Regional Director of the Bureau, or the Immigration and Naturaliza­
tion Service ("INS") has determined that it will not initiate a deportation hearing against the 
inmate. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 651 n2. Conversely, if the INS has ordered the alien to be de­
ported following incarceration, the alien will be denied access to community confinement 
even if he or she meets these three requirements. See BUREAU OF PRISONS, 5100.07, ch. 7, 
at 4. 
14. Although Program Statement 5100.07 does not expressly state the reasons for the 
special treatment of deportable aliens, the three requirements for an alien to get an excep· 
tion to the ordinary level of incarceration, enumerated at supra note 13, suggest that the 
threat of escape, with its accompanying defeat of the alien's eventual deportation, was a cen­
tral concern. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 655 (suggesting that flight risk was the rationale underly­
ing the Bureau's denial of access to prerelease programs to deportable aliens). In addition, 
the risk of escape is a crucial factor in Bureau decisions respecting the level of incarceration. 
See BUREAU OF PRISONS, 5100.07, ch. 7, at 4-5. 
15. The phrase "all else being equal" refers to the circumstances of the crime and the 
criminal history of the defendant. In other words, it envisions an identical case with the ex­
ception that the defendant is not a deportable alien. 
16. See, e.g., United States v. Farouil, 124 F.3d 838, 847 (7th Cir. 1997) (requiring the 
sentencing court to consider a departure on the basis of alienage when the defendant's alien 
status causes an increase in the objective harshness of confinement conditions); Smith, 27 
F.3d at 649 (same); United States v. Bakeas, 987 F. Supp. 44, 47-49 (D. Mass. 1997) (follow­
ing Farouil and Smith, and departing downward on the basis of the defendant's alien status). 
17. 27 F.3d at 649. 
18. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 650. 
19. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 650. 
20. Smith, 27 F.3d at 650. The D.C. Circuit recognized that the district judge's language 
was ambiguous, and could have meant that "she had authority to depart but the circum­
stances did not warrant departure." Smith, 27 F.3d at 650 n.1. The court, however, assumed, 
for the purposes of the opinion, that the language meant that the judge thought she lacked 
authority to depart. Smith, 27 F.3d at 650 & n.1. In a recent opinion, Judge Sentelle (the 
dissenter in Smith) discussed the effect of ambiguous statements, such as these, and argued 
that they should usually be interpreted as an indication that the judge could not, in good 
conscience, depart on a given factor. Judge Sentelle, therefore, did not interpret the state-
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Smith argued that the district judge improperly refused to consider 
that Smith would be subject to harsher conditions of confinement than 
an otherwise similarly situated American citizen who had been con­
victed of the same crime.21 Smith pointed out that he would "almost 
certainly [be] ineligible for the benefits of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c).'722 That 
provision requires the Bureau of Prisons, 
to the extent practicable, [to] assure that a prisoner serving a term of im­
prisonment spends a reasonable part, not to exceed six months, of the 
last 10 per centum of the term . . .  under conditions that will afford the 
prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and prepare for the pris­
oner's re-entry into the community.23 
The D.C. Court of Appeals noted that the Bureau of Prisons regula­
tions make it nearly impossible for a deportable alien to qualify for 
such favorable prerelease programs.24 The court held "that a down­
ward departure may be appropriate where the defendant's status as a 
deportable alien is likely to cause a fortuitous increase in the severity 
of his sentence."25 Since the district judge's statement that she did not 
see any basis for departure could have been interpreted as indicating 
that the judge felt that she lacked authority to depart on such a basis, 
the court reversed and remanded for resentencing.26 
ment "I don't have any alternative" as a misunderstanding of the judge's ability to depart 
from the Guidelines. See In re Sealed Case, 199 F.3d 488, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
21. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 650. 
22 Smith, 27 F.3d at 650-51 (citing 18 U.S.C. 3624( c) {1994)). 
23. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) (1994). 
24. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 651; see also supra note 1 3. 
25. Smith, 27 F.3d at 655. "Fortuitous" is probably the last word that an alien defendant 
would use to describe this situation. Perhaps a more accurate description would be: an in­
crease in the severity of sentence, which is unconnected to guiltiness or any other justifiable 
basis for increasing the severity of punishment. The cases on this subject, however, use the 
shorthand phrase "fortuitous increase in the severity," see, e.g., Smith, 27 F.3d at 655, which 
should be read as emphasizing the "chance" or "randomness" with which the increase in se­
verity applies to alien defendants, rather than the "good luck" of the defendants. The key 
point is to distinguish these cases from the situation in which a defendant's status as an alien 
is a relevant factor in detemiining his "guiltiness," and therefore, his punishment. See, e.g., 
United States v. Gonzalez-Portillo, 121 F.3d 1122, 1125 (7th Cir. 1997) (distinguishing Smith 
because the defendant was convicted of illegal reentry into the United States, a crime that 
can only be committed by aliens, and therefore the Commission must have taken alien status 
into account when setting the Guidelines range for this offense); United States v. Ebolum, 72 
F.3d 35, 38-39 (6th Cir.1995) (same). 
26. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 656. The court, however, noted that some limitations should be 
placed on sentencing courts considering a departure on the basis of alienage, in order to en­
sure that such departures remain the exception, and not the rule. The court stated: 
For a departure on such a basis to be reasonable the difference in severity must be substan­
tial and the sentencing court must have a high degree of confidence that it will in fact apply 
for a substantial portion of the defendant's sentence. Finally, as the defendant's status as a 
deportable alien is by no means necessarily unrelated to his just des[s]erts, even a court con­
fident that the status will lead to worse conditions should depart only when persuaded that 
the greater severity is undeserved. Thus the court will fulfil the Guidelines' command that 
such departures will be "highly infrequent." 
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Other federal courts have rejected this approach. These courts 
have stated that anticipation of harsher conditions of confinement, 
stemming solely from a defendant's status as a deportable alien, may 
never serve as the basis for a downward departure.27 For instance, in 
United States v. Restrepo,']J!, the Second Circuit vacated a district court's 
imposition of a sentence that was based partly on a downward depar­
ture in anticipation of the alien defendant's ineligibility for halfway 
houses or other minimum security facilities. The Restrepo court rea­
soned that Congress gave the Bureau of Prisons discretion over the 
placement of inmates, and altering a sentence in anticipation of a 
harsh placement would amount to an encroachment on the Bureau's 
discretion.29 
A 1996 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Koon v. United States, ad­
dressed departures from the Guidelines and held that appellate courts 
could not categorically proscribe a factor as the basis of a departure 
unless that factor was explicitly forbidden from consideration by the 
Guidelines.30 Although the tension between the Supreme Court's 
statement in Koon and the cases rejecting departures on the basis of 
alienage is apparent, the Koon case has failed to resolve the issue. Al­
though several federal courts have read Koon as implicitly overruling 
Restrepo,31 others have continued to follow Restrepo and have refused 
to depart on the basis of alienage.32 
Id. at 655. These limitations serve an important function, and should alleviate many of the 
concerns that other courts have had concerning such departures. See infra Section I.B & 
Part III. 
27. See, e.g., United States v. Gregory, No. 97-4090, 1998 WL 390176 (4th Cir. June 23, 
1998) (maintaining that alien status alone is an inappropriate basis for departure); United 
States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that increased harshness in the con· 
ditions of confinement stemming from alien status is not a proper basis for a downward de­
parture); Martin-Camacho v. United States, No. 96 CR 0475(SJ), 1998 WL 352313 
(E.D.N.Y. June 24, 1998) (explicitly following Restrepo and rejecting Smith); Tsang v. 
United States, No. 97 CIV. 1886 (CSH), 1997 WL 630182 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1997) (same). 
28. 999 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1993). 
29. See Restrepo, 999 F.2d at 645-46. 
30. 518 U.S. 81, 106-07 (1996) ("Thus, for the courts to conclude a factor must not be 
considered under any circumstances would be to transgress the policymaking authority 
vested in the Commission."). 
31. See, e.g., United States v. Farouil, 124 F.3d 838, 847 (7th Cir. 1997) (viewing Koon as 
resolving the issue in favor of the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Smith); United States v. Angel­
Martinez, 988 F. Supp. 475, 483 (D.N.J. 1997) (same); see also United States v. DeBeir, 186 
F.3d 561, 569 (4th Cir. 1999) (considering departures on the basis of alienage and noting, in 
dicta, that Koon "clarified that a district court is free to consider any factor not prohibited by 
the Guidelines"). 
32. One court of appeals and a number of district courts have relied explicitly on 
Restrepo in holding that a defendant's status as a deportable alien is not an appropriate basis 
for departure, even after the Koon decision. See Gregory, 1998 WL 390176 at *6; Martin­
Camacho, 1998 WL 352313 at *2; Tsang, 1997 WL 630182 at *2. 
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This Note argues that district court judges should not be categori­
cally prohibited from departing on the basis of alienage. Instead, they 
should have discretion to depart downward from a prescribed sen­
tence on the basis of a defendant's status as a deportable alien, when 
that status results in a "fortuitous" increase in the severity of the sen­
tence. Part I of this Note argues that departures on the basis of alien­
age in anticipation of harsh conditions of confinement are consistent 
with Congress's charge to the Commission, Congress's intent in en­
acting section 3624, and with the Guidelines themselves. Part II ar­
gues that the Supreme Court's decision in Koon and a recent amend­
ment to the Guidelines prohibit categorical rejections of bases for 
departure that are not specifically forbidden by the Guidelines, and 
that the Supreme Court and the Commission would, therefore, allow 
such departures in some cases. Part III of this Note argues that equal­
ity in sentencing and effective use of judicial discretion mandate that 
appellate judges defer to the discretion of district judges who depart 
downward on the basis of alienage in appropriate cases. Specifically, 
Part ill concludes that aliens and citizens have substantially equal 
rights under criminal law, and that district judges should therefore be 
allowed to depart on the basis of a defendant's status as a deportable 
alien when that status adversely affects the defendant's conditions of 
confinement. 
I. THE PRE-KOON ANALYSIS: ALLOWING DEPARTURES 
ON THE BASIS OF ALIENAGE IN ANTICIPATION 
OF HARSH CONFINEMENT CONDffiONS 
This Part argues that, even absent the Supreme Court's pro­
nouncement in Koon, the Guidelines should be interpreted to permit a 
downward departure on the basis of alienage in order to offset the 
harsher conditions of confinement faced by aliens who are not eligible 
for prerelease programs. Section I.A shows that the term "mitigating 
circumstances," as used in Congress's charge to the Commission, may 
be interpreted to include alienage, because to do so would remain 
consistent with Congressional intent. Section L B  argues that depart­
ing in anticipation of an alien's harsh conditions of confinement is a 
legitimate use of the departure tool for sentencing judges, since judges 
depart to offset other prospective conditions. Finally, Section L C  re­
sponds to the argument that Congress never intended aliens to benefit 
from the programs described in section 3624 and concludes that, ab­
sent evidence of an intent to treat aliens more harshly, a departure is 
warranted to offset the disparate confinement effects stemming from 
section 3624. 
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The starting point for the consideration of alienage as a mitigating 
circumstance is the text of the departure provision, 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(b ).33 According to that provision, alienage must be either an 
"aggravating or mitigating circumstance" in order to be a valid basis 
for departure from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.34 Courts allowing 
for departure on the basis of alienage have determined that it can 
sometimes be a mitigating circumstance.35 This conclusion, however, 
is not beyond question. At least one judge has argued strenuously that 
alienage, as an offender characteristic, should never be considered a 
mitigating circumstance.36 This Section demonstrates that alienage can 
be a mitigating circumstance under the Guidelines, by showing that 
such an interpretation is consistent with the congressional directive to 
the Commission. 
A complete view of the legislative directive to the Commission re­
veals that Congress may have intended for offender characteristics, in­
cluding alienage, to sometimes qualify as "mitigating circumstances." 
The text of the departure provision, section 3553(b ), does not state 
expressly that offender characteristics should be included as mitigating 
circumstances.37 Evidence from portions of the congressional directive 
to the Commission, however, supports the proposition that Congress 
did envision offender characteristics as potential mitigating circum­
stances. Most revealing is 18 U.S.C. § 994, which lists a number of of­
fender characteristics (not including alienage) as potential factors in 
determining the appropriate sentence, and instructs the Sentencing 
Commission to determine whether or not those factors were rele-
33. See text of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b ), supra note 6. 
34. In 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), Congress expressly allowed sentencing judges the discretion 
to depart from the Guidelines on the basis of "aggravating or mitigating circumstances" that 
were not adequately taken into account by the Commission in formulating the Guidelines. 
35. See United States v. Smith, 27 F.3d 649, 651-54 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (arguing that alien­
age can be a "mitigating circumstance"); see also Farouil, 124 F.3d at 846-47 (generally fol­
lowing the Smith approach); United States v. Bakeas, 987 F. Supp. 44, 47-49 (D. Mass. 1997) 
(same). 
36. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 657-69 {Sentelle, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the Commis­
sion did not intend for alienage to be considered a mitigating circumstance). Offender char­
acteristics should be distinguished from offense characteristics. The former refer to attrib­
utes of the defendant himself, such as: age, education, physical condition, family ties, 
criminal history, and community ties. The latter refer to attributes of the crime itself, such 
as: whether the victim died, whether a weapon was used, and whether the defendant con­
fessed to the crime. See generally USSG § lBl.1; United States v. La Bonte, 520 U.S. 751, 
764-65 (1997). 
37. See text of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b ), supra note 6. 
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vant.38 The list of characteristics in section 994 is not exclusive,39 and 
therefore it is reasonable to assume that other offender characteristics 
may also be mitigating circumstances.40 
The Commission's response to section 994 is found in Chapter 5, 
Part H of the Guidelines, which states that the offender characteristics 
listed in section 994 are "not ordinarily relevant" to the decision to 
depart, but may, in "exceptional" cases, be relevant to that decision.41 
The Guidelines further "make[] plain that [these offender characteris­
tics] may be a basis for departure even in circumstances where their 
connection to the sentence has nothing to do with moral blameworthi­
ness."42 
This text from the Guidelines suggests that, in the Commission's 
view, some offender characteristics may be used as the basis for depar­
ture, albeit only in unusual cases. Although alien status is not specifi­
cally mentioned as one of the offender characteristics that might be 
relevant, the Sentencing Commission's statement in the Guidelines 
Manual, Chapter 1, Part A shows that the Commission did not intend 
to prohibit departure for alien status. This portion of the Guidelines 
Manual reads: 
Section 5Hl.10 (Race, Sex, National Origin, Creed, Religion, and Socio­
Economic Status), § 5Hl.12 (Lack of Guidance as a Youth and Similar 
Circumstances), the third sentence of § 5Hl.4 (Physical Condition, In­
cluding Drug or Alcohol Dependence or Abuse), and the last sentence of 
§ 5K2.12 (Coercion and Duress) list several factors that the court cannot 
take into account as grounds for departure. With those specific excep­
tions, however, the Commission does not intend to limit the kinds of fac­
tors, whether or not mentioned anywhere else in the guidelines, that could 
constitute grounds for departure in an unusual case. 43 
As this statement makes clear, the mere fact that alienage is not 
mentioned in Chapter 5, Part H of the Guidelines is not sufficient evi-
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (1994). This section directs the Commission to "consider 
whether the following matters, among others, with respect to a defendant, have any rele­
vance to the nature, extent, place of service, or other incidents of an appropriate sen­
tence . . .. " 28 U.S.C. § 994(d). Congress's list of factors in§ 994(d) consists mostly of of­
fender characteristics, such as age, education, vocational skills, physical condition, 
community ties, family ties, and criminal history. Section 994( d) further directs the Commis­
sion to "take [these factors] into account only to the extent that they do have relevance." 28 
u.s.c. § 994(d). 
39. This is clear from the inclusion of the phrase "among others" in the statute. See 28 
U .S.C. § 994{ d), supra note 38. 
40. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 651-52 (noting that ten of the eleven items listed in § 994{ d) are 
offender characteristics). 
41. See USSG ch. 5, pt. H, intro. cmt. {1998). The Guidelines seem to equate "excep­
tional" or "unusual" cases with those cases falling outside the "heartland" of cases. See su­
pra note 9 for a complete discussion of the "heartland" concept. 
42 Smith, 27 F .3d at 652. 
43. USSG ch. 1, pt. A at 4{b) (1998) (emphasis added). 
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dence to conclude that the Sentencing Commission has determined 
that it is always irrelevant. Under the Guidelines, therefore, a defen­
dant's status as an alien is an offender characteristic that may be con­
sidered by the sentencing court. Alien status, thus, stands in stark con­
trast to factors such as race and national origin,44 which are expressly 
forbidden. The conclusion, then, that alien status may be considered 
as a mitigating circumstance (and hence the basis for a departure) in 
certain, limited circumstances is consistent with Congress's directive to 
the Commission. 
Upon concluding that alienage could be a mitigating circumstance, 
the Smith decision held that sentencing courts have the discretion to 
depart on the basis of alienage.45 The court, however, limited such de­
partures to cases in which the alien faces a substantially more severe 
sentence over a substantial portion of his sentence, due to his alien 
status, when that status is unrelated to his just desserts. In such an 
"unusual"46 case, alienage is a relevant factor that was not considered 
by the Commission in drafting the Guidelines, and therefore, a down­
ward departure is well within the discretion of the sentencing judge. 
One criticism that has been levied against this conclusion is that it 
inappropriately relies on Congress's charge to the Commission in 28 
U.S.C. § 994. For example, the dissent in Smith stated that 
28 U.S.C. § 994(d) has nothing whatsoever to do with mitigating circum­
stances under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). 28 U.S.C. § 994 was the charge to the 
Sentencing Commission setting out the scope of its undertaking .... That 
section is not directed to the sentencing of defendants, but rather toward 
the creation of a set of guidelines, which are then to be the framework 
for sentencing defendants.47 
In other words, the dissent maintains that the nonexclusive list of fac­
tors in section 994 is an inappropriate place to look for the definition 
of "mitigating circumstances" as used in section 3553(b ), since section 
994 was simply a directive to the Sentencing Commission and not a 
definitional provision. 
The Smith dissent, however, mischaracterizes the effect of section 
994. Neither this Note nor the courts allowing for departures on the 
basis of alienage argue that section 994 defines the phrase "aggravat-
44. See supra note 12 for the distinction between national origin and alienage. 
45. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 655. 
46. The court in Smith noted that the limitations it provided, see supra note 26, would be 
sufficient to keep such departures "highly infrequent." Even if most aliens will meet these 
limitations and be eligible for such a departure, (which is not at all clear, see supra note 26), 
this does not offend the Commission's desire for departures based on unmentioned factors 
to be unusual. The Commission recognized that it did not foresee all potential mitigating 
and aggravating circumstances. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. The case of aliens 
who are ineligible for halfway houses may simply be the sort of case that was unusual 
enough to be overlooked by the Commission in setting the Guidelines for most offenses. 
47. Smith, 27 F.3d at 658 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
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ing or mitigating circumstance."48 Rather, this Note demonstrates that 
treating alienage as a mitigating circumstance is consistent with 
Congress's directives, given the Commission's approach to offender 
characteristics in section SH. Section 994 illustrates that Congress an­
ticipated that some offender characteristics might be relevant to sen­
tencing and, therefore, directed the Commission to consider a number 
of them to determine whether they were relevant and to incorporate 
them into the Guidelines accordingly.49 
The dissent continues by arguing that Congress's directive in sec­
tion 994 was met by the Commission's treatment of the characteristics 
in Section SH, and that there is, therefore, no basis for a court to rely 
on this directive to interpret the phrase "mitigating circumstances."50 
In other words, since Congress only instructed the Commission to con­
sider each of a number of factors in section 994, once the Commission 
decided how to treat each factor under section SH, section 994 lost any 
value in aiding the interpretation of other relevant provisions. This 
argument, however, overlooks the reality that the end result of the di­
rective of section 994 was not only section SH, but the entire frame­
work of the Guidelines as a whole. That the Sentencing Commission 
chose to forbid only a few factors from departure consideration re­
flects the method that the Commission thought would be most appro­
priate in meeting Congress's directive. By including some offender 
characteristics in section SH, and by clearly stating that no factors are 
forbidden other than those expressly named in the Guidelines, the 
Commission made it clear that unmentioned offender characteristics 
may be considered mitigating circumstances and serve as the basis for 
a departure. The Smith decision demonstrates the consistency of this 
approach with Congressional intent by pointing to section 994 simply 
to show that Congress realized that some offender characteristics 
might be relevant to sentencing and should, therefore, be incorporated 
into the Guidelines' overall scheme.51 
A second argument against treating alienage as a mitigating cir­
cumstance is that each of the factors listed in section SH were declared 
48. The majority in Smith never claims that § 994 determines the definition of "mitigat­
ing circumstances." Rather, the majority notes that the Commission has interpreted that 
phrase to include some offender characteristics, and that the Commission's interpretation is 
not an unreasonable one, given Congress's indications in § 994. Specifically, the majority's 
argument is that: "The first question is whether§ 3SS 3(b) reaches offender characteristics 
not related to culpability .... We believe that although the controlling statutes are ambigu­
ous on the point, the Sentencing Commission has answered it affirmatively, and that that an­
swer is an entirely reasonable reading of the statutes." Smith, 27 F.3d at 6Sl (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted). 
49. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
SO. Smith, 27 F.3d at 6S9 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (stating that "the Commission has car­
ried out its statutory charge .... [T]he Commission has determined and specified in § SH of 
the guidelines the extent to which each of several characteristics has relevance .... "). 
Sl. See supra note 48. 
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by the Commission to be "not ordinarily relevant in determining 
whether a sentence should be outside the applicable Guideline 
range."s2 This argument maintains that the Commission's treatment of 
the section 994 factors in section SH is an insufficient basis on which to 
determine that the Commission has interpreted "mitigating circum­
stances" as including some offender characteristics, such as alienage.s3 
While it is true that the Commission has declared the offender 
characteristics in section SH to be "not ordinarily relevant" to a deci­
sion to depart,54 it does not follow that the Commission thought they 
would never be relevant to departure. The Commission carefully 
framed the use of factors for departing, and specifically declared that 
only the factors expressly forbidden were beyond the authority of a 
court to consider as bases for a departure. Therefore, although not an 
approval of the frequent use of certain discouraged offender charac­
teristics, such as extreme age, for departure, section SH does support 
an interpretation of "mitigating circumstances" that would include any 
offender characteristic not expressly forbidden. 
In response to this reasoning, those advancing this second argu­
ment contend that such a "nod to the possibility of unforeseen circum­
stances" is not sufficient evidence of the Commission's interpretation 
of "mitigating circumstances" to command deference from the 
courts.ss The Commission's choice of a framework that encourages 
some factors, discourages others, and expressly forbids only a few,56 
however, should not be thought of as merely a "nod" to the unfore­
seen. Rather, such a detailed breakdown of factors shows that a vari­
ety of offender characteristics may be relevant in some extraordinary 
cases. For this reason, the Commission was careful not to remove 
completely consideration of these "not ordinarily relevant" factors 
from the authority of the sentencing courts. In keeping with that 
framework, this Note only advocates departures on the basis of alien­
age in certain, limited circumstances, thus making it similar to factors 
that are expressly declared not ordinarily relevants7 (i.e., a "discour­
aged" factor58). 
52 Smith, 27 F.3d at 660 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (quoting USSG §§ 5Hl.1-5Hl.6). 
53. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 660 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
54. See USSG ch. 5, pt. H (1995). 
55. Smith, 27 F.3d at 660 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
56. For an explanation of "encouraged," "discouraged," "forbidden," and "unmen­
tioned" factors, see supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. 
57. In particular, this Note advocates departure under the limitations suggested by the 
Smith court. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
58. See supra note 9.  
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B. Departure in Anticipation of Harsh Confinement Conditions 
In departing from the Guidelines on the basis of alienage, judges 
must anticipate that the alien will face harsher conditions of confine­
ment once incarcerated. Initially, such a departure may seem inap­
propriate as unduly speculative, since the court is essentially predict­
ing where the Bureau of Prisons will place the defendant, and then 
sentencing accordingly.59 Some courts, recognizing the "anticipatory" 
nature of the departure, have refused to depart on the basis of alien­
age.ro These courts primarily are concerned that this anticipatory de­
parture may encroach on the authority of other agencies - specifi­
cally the Bureau of Prisons, which is charged with the decision 
whether a given inmate will be placed in minimum security confine­
ment or community confinement.61 The purpose of Section I.B is to 
demonstrate the propriety of such a "preemptive" departure. Antici­
patory departures often are used by courts in other situations without 
serious question. Even if anticipatory departures are not always valid, 
they should be upheld in the specific case of conditions of confinement 
departures for aliens. 
"Encroachments" on the discretion of the Bureau or other prison 
authorities have been upheld in other cases involving similar circum­
stances.62 In a number of cases, federal courts have upheld departures 
in anticipation of Bureau (or other prison authority) actions that 
would cause a seemingly "fortuitous" increase in the objective severity 
of the sentence.63 For instance, in United States v. Lara, the Second 
59. The sentencing court is also necessarily predicting that the Bureau's policy will not 
change within the time the alien is sentenced and that the alien would otherwise become eli­
gible for the prerelease confinement described in 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) (1994). Although 
prison regulations are more susceptible to change than a statute, there is no indication that 
there is any momentum or pressure to change this particular Bureau policy. 
60. See, e.g., United States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1993). In Restrepo, the 
court reversed the sentencing court's decision to depart on the basis of alienage, relying 
heavily on Congress's intent to give the Bureau of Prisons discretion with respect to the ap­
plication of 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (the same confinement provision at issue in Smith). The Sec­
ond Circuit characterized the kind of anticipatory departure embraced by the Smith court as 
an "encroachment" on the Bureau of Prison's discretion. See id. at 645; see also United 
States v. Sutton, 973 F. Supp. 488 (D.N.J. 1997) (encouraging the Commission to make con­
ditions of confinement a forbidden factor, in part relying on Restrepo's characterization of 
anticipatory departures as "speculative and inappropriate"). 
61. See supra note 13 for a description of the Bureau's authority over the placement of 
inmates. 
62 See United States v. Smith, 27 F3d 649, 654-55 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
63. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 653-55. These other cases typically involve the offsetting of 
potential victimization or potential solitary confinement due to vulnerability. See, e.g., 
United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1990) (approving a downward departure where 
the district court found that the defendant's small size, his appearance, and his bisexual ori­
entation made him extremely susceptible to abuse in prison, and that the only way for prison 
officials to protect him would be to place him in solitary confinement); see also United States 
v. Tucker, 986 F.2d 278 (8th Cir. 1993) (agreeing with Lara that potential for victimization in 
prison may be a justifiable basis for departure, but finding insufficient evidence of such po-
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Circuit upheld a departure as a means to offset the probability that 
prison authorities would place a particularly vulnerable defendant in 
solitary confinement in order to protect him from sexual assault.64 In 
United States v. Tucker, the Eighth Circuit agreed that sentencing 
courts may depart downward in anticipation of abuse in prison.65 
These decisions indicate that, when the policies of the Bureau or other 
prison officials are predictable enough to enable the court to foresee a 
fortuitous increase in the severity of the sentence for a particular de­
fendant, the sentencing court may depart to "offset" the harsh out­
come. 66 
Even if it is not always valid to depart on the basis of an 
anticipated event, the specific anticipatory departure at issue in this 
Note should be allowed because it is more predictable than other 
Bureau decisions. First, departure on the basis of alienage for harsh 
conditions of confinement is based on a uniquely certain event - the 
denial of access to prerelease programs. The clarity and certainty of 
the Bureau of Prisons policy67 make it extremely unlikely that a 
deportable alien defendant will be granted access to prerelease 
programs. In addition, it would be easy for a sentencing judge to learn 
of the alien's circumstances so as to predict with nearly perfect 
accuracy whether or not the defendant will meet the Bureau's 
requirements for placement in a halfway house.68 This level of 
tential for victimization to support such a departure); United States v. Gonzalez, 945 F.2d 
525 (2d Cir. 1991) (approving a departure where the defendant had a feminine appearance, 
would be susceptible to abuse in prison, and would likely face more severe prison conditions 
as a result). In Gonzalez, the Second Circuit stressed that sentencing courts should be able 
to depart even before any abuse actually has occurred. See Gonzalez, 945 F.2d at 527. 
64. 905 F.2d at 603. 
65. 986 F.2d at 280. 
66. In addition to these cases, the U.S. Supreme Court apparently granted its approval 
to such anticipatory departures in Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996). Although the 
full implication of Koon is discussed infra Part II, it should be noted at this point that the 
Court upheld the trial court's grant of a dovmward departure in anticipation of the defen· 
dants' susceptibility to abuse in prison, which was clearly in anticipation of future events. In 
doing so, the Court cited Lara as an example, and noted that, after Lara, the Commission 
made "physical . . .  appearance, including physique" a discouraged factor. See Koon, 518 
U.S. at 107. The Court went on to state that even discouraged factors are not totally re· 
moved from the consideration of the sentencing judge as a basis for departure. See id. at 
107-09. With respect to the susceptibility departure, the Court affirmed the district court's 
decision to depart, which was based on the finding that the defendants were "particularly 
likely to be targets of abuse during their incarceration." Id. at 112 (quoting United States v. 
Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769, 788 (C.D. Cal. 1993)). The extraordinarily high degree of probabil· 
ity that the defendants would be abused was enough to support the district court's conclu­
sion that this was an "unusual" case that the Commission had not considered. See id. 
67. The Bureau's policy is stated in BUREAU OF PRISONS, 5100.07, ch. 7, supra note 13. 
68. The judge simply would need to inquire about whether the INS has declared its in· 
tent to deport the alien following incarceration, and whether the alien has the requisite ties 
to the community listed in BUREAU OF PRISONS, 5100.07, ch. 7, at 3-4, supra note 13. This 
makes the determination that the alien will be denied access to a halfway house an easy one. 
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certainty is at least greater than that which a sentencing judge could 
have about whether or not a given defendant will be abused in prison 
- an anticipation that, as noted above, frequently has been upheld as 
valid, even by the Supreme Court.69 
Second, the departure at issue here can be limited specifically by 
the restrictions established in Smith. In Smith, the D.C. Circuit ex­
pressly limited departures on the basis of alienage to cases in which 
the difference in severity (1) is substantial, (2) will apply for a substan­
tial part of the sentence, and (3) is "undeserved."70 These limits act to 
prevent a court from encroaching too far on the discretion Congress 
granted to the Bureau. As long as the courts granting downward de­
partures are restrained by these three requirements, the departures do 
not represent an improper threat to the discretion of the Bureau. 
C. Congressional Intent 
Critics of anticipatory departures based on alienage argue that 
Congress never intended for section 3624 to apply to aliens, since ali­
ens will be deported following the completion of their prison term. 
These critics rely on the text of section 3624 to contend that the pur­
pose of prerelease programs (such as halfway houses) is to give the 
prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and "prepare for his re­
entry into the community."71 For example, the Restrepo court noted: 
Given the focus of § 3624(c) on prisoners who are to reenter the commu­
nity, it is arguable that Congress, having instructed that deportable aliens 
not be released into the community, did not mean § 3624(c) to apply to 
such aliens. Had Congress so stated, a court's disapproval of that policy 
choice would not be an appropriate basis for a departure from the 
Guidelines . . . . 72 
At first, this argument seems persuasive, given the inclusion of the 
language "re-entry into the community."73 The argument, however, 
The determination of whether the alien's status was the only factor that caused that denial, 
however, is an altogether different, and much more difficult, determination. For a discussion 
of this problem, and how it may affect the number of these anticipatory departures, see infra 
note 11 3. United States v. DeBeir, 186 F3d 561 (4th Cir. 1999), is an example of a situation 
in which the defendant's alienage was not the only factor that caused the denial of access to 
a halfway house. In DeBeir, the Fourth Circuit distinguished Smith by pointing out that the 
alien defendant in this case was unable to find a halfway house that would take him because 
of the nature of his offense (involving the sexual assault of a minor), not because of his alien 
status. See DeBeir, 186 F.3d at 569-70. 
69. See supra notes 6 3-66. 
70. See United States v. Smith, 27 F. 3d 649, 655 (D.C. Cir.1994). 
71. United States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640, 645 (2d Cir. 199 3) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 
3624(c) (1988 & Supp. II 1990)). 
72 Restrepo, 999 F.2d at 645. 
7 3. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) (1994). 
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has little support in the legislative history of section 3624, and in this 
country's historical treatment of aliens. 
The legislative history of the provision and the general legal status 
of aliens in the United States do not support an interpretation of sec­
tion 3624 that would treat aliens more harshly than citizens. To make 
this point clear, the counterargument must be fully understood. Es­
sentially, the argument is that since Congress meant to exclude aliens 
from the benefits of section 3624, the aliens should not get an offset­
ting departure. For the counterargument to be persuasive, it must be 
true that Congress consciously intended to treat aliens more harshly 
than citizens, by not allowing them to be placed in the halfway houses 
contemplated under section 3624.74 
If Congress actually intended to treat aliens more harshly, it would 
have been deviating from the traditional treatment of aliens in the 
United States legal system. Although alien status may not rise to the 
level of a protected classification, such as race, it is a characteristic that 
the Supreme Court has deemed worthy of some level of heightened 
scrutiny in constitutional analysis.75 The fact that the Court has 
treated alienage as a category warranting some heightened scrutiny 
would suggest that Congress would not distinguish lightly between ali­
ens and U.S. citizens in a statute. Furthermore, distinctions on the ba­
sis of alienage in the specific context of criminal punishment may be 
74. An assumption that Congress simply overlooked the disparate effects of § 3624 on 
alien inmates (as one would probably suspect) would not be sufficient to support the coun­
terargument. If that were the case, then the critic should not object to a departure by a sen­
tencing judge to offset the unintended harsh effects of the statute on alien defendants. In· 
deed, the Restrepo court's argument centers on the inappropriateness of a departure that 
"palliates" the intent of Congress. See Restrepo, 999 F.2d at 645. 
75. The Supreme Court's decisions regarding the constitutionality of laws distinguishing 
between aliens and citizens leave much confusion. The Supreme Court, in 1971, seemed to 
adopt a strict scrutiny test for the review of state laws that drew such a distinction. See 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (holding that states may not deny welfare bene­
fits to aliens). In 1978, however, the Court began to review such laws more deferentially. 
See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (upholding a New York law that prohibited aliens 
from being state troopers). In Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), the Court applied a def­
erential standard to uphold a federal law that conditioned aliens' eligibility for Medicare on 
admission for permanent residence and continuous residence for five years. That the Court 
has moved toward more deference, especially with respect to federal regulation of aliens, 
however, does not make the counterargument persuasive. To the contrary, the simple fact 
that alienage has fallen somewhere between strict scrutiny and rational basis review suggests 
that the U.S. legal system is sensitive to discrimination on the basis of alienage. See generally 
GERALD GUNTIIER & KA1HLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 720-25 (1997) 
(listing alienage among the "other classifications arguably warranting heightened scrutiny," 
and discussing the Supreme Court's decisions). Section 3624, a federal regulation, would 
probably have been upheld if it was determined to be not arbitrary or unreasonable, even if 
it explicitly denied aliens access to halfway houses. The Court's general skepticism of classi­
fications on the basis of alienage, however, would suggest that if Congress meant to classify 
on that basis, it would have done so expressly in the statute, or would have at least men­
tioned it in the legislative history. This observation is sufficient to undermine the counterar­
gument that Congress actually did mean to deny aliens the benefits of § 3624, even though 
the legislative history does not reveal that intent. 
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even more susceptible to the scrutiny of federal courts.76 It is difficult 
to imagine, therefore, that Congress intentionally would punish aliens 
more severely than citizens without any record of such an intent in the 
legislative history. To the contrary, at other places in the U.S. Code, 
Congress appears to hold a strong conviction that aliens should not be 
punished differently than citizens.77 
It may well be true that Congress actually intended to treat aliens 
differently under section 3624. But if Congress consciously made this 
decision, it would be reflected in the legislative history of section 3624. 
The history of alien status in Constitutional law would make such a 
disparate treatment of aliens a significant legislative move - one that 
would not be made lightly. A comprehensive search of the legislative 
history of section 3624, however, reveals no debates about such dispa­
rate treatment of aliens, nor any other indication that Congress delib­
erately decided to treat aliens unequally in light of countervailing pol­
icy concems.78 The counterargument simply ignores this gap in the 
legislative history and reads into the plain language of the statute an 
intent to differentiate between aliens and citizens. Although it may be 
possible to imagine compelling reasons for Congress to make such a 
differentiation,79 an assumption that Congress so intended is simply 
too much of a leap when the resulting interpretation treats aliens dif­
ferently than other inmates. In the absence of any concrete evidence, 
any ambiguity about Congress's intent in enacting section 3624 should 
be resolved in favor of the equal treatment of aliens and citizens. 
II. THE POST-KOON ANALYSIS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
SENTENCING COMMISSION AGREE 
To this point, this Note has demonstrated that a departure on the 
basis of alienage in anticipation of ineligibility for prerelease programs 
is not inconsistent with the Sentencing Guidelines, congressional in­
tent, and common law notions about the validity of anticipatory depar­
tures. Part II argues that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in 1996, 
76. See, e.g., United States v. Borrero-Isaza, 887 F.2d 1 349, 1 352 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating 
that giving a defendant a more severe sentence on the basis of national origin and alienage is 
a violation of due process rights); United States v. Gomez, 797 F.2d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(stating that sentencing a defendant more severely on the basis of nationality or alien status 
is unconstitutional). 
77. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994 & Supp. II 1996), discussed infra note 116, which makes it 
a crime to punish aliens more severely on the basis of their alien status. 
78. In fact, there is very scant legislative history on the provision at issue. Senate Re­
port 98-225 specifically addresses § 3624(c), and makes no mention of an intention to ex­
clude aliens from the benefits of the provision. See S. REP. No. 98-225 (198 3). 
79. For instance, Congress could have intended to deny aliens access to halfway house 
programs because of a fear that deportable aliens would be more likely to attempt to escape 
from them to defeat deportation. 
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Koon v. United States,80 should have settled the dispute once and for 
all - invalidating the categorical approach to departures in favor of 
an approach that affords sentencing judges more discretion. Section 
IT.A of this Note argues that the Koon decision reaffirmed a discre­
tionary approach to departures, and implicitly overruled decisions that 
categorically prohibit departure factors that are not forbidden by the 
Guidelines. Section Il.B discusses a recent amendment to the Guide­
lines that incorporated Koon, and concludes that the amendment also 
endorses the discretionary approach. 
A. The Court's Rejection of a Categorical Approach to Departures 
in Favor of Sentencing Court Discretion 
In Koon, the defendants were police officers convicted of "violat­
ing [a suspect's] constitutional rights under color of law" during the 
arrest of Rodney King.81 The intense media coverage and the anger 
felt by the black community in Los Angeles toward the defendants 
made Koon a special case - one in which the district court found sev­
eral factors that took the case outside of the "heartland" of Guidelines 
cases.82 The district court, therefore, departed downward from the 
Guidelines on a number of bases, including the officers' susceptibility 
to abuse in prison.83 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected all 
of the bases for departure relied upon by the district judge,84 but the 
80. 518 U.S. 81 (1996). 
81. Koon, 518 U.S. at 88. The district court found the following facts: California High­
way Patrol officers saw King, who was intoxicated, speeding on a major freeway and at­
tempted to pull him over. They followed him with their lights on and used the loudspeaker 
to order him to pull over, but King kept driving. The defendants, Los Angeles Police De­
partment officers, joined in the chase. After the police had chased King for about eight 
miles, King stopped at a recreation area. The officers ordered King to assume a felony 
prone position (lying face down on his stomach with his legs spread and his arms behind his 
back). King got on his knees, but did not lie down. When some officers tried to force him 
down, he resisted. Defendant Koon then used a taser dart to stun King. King then got up 
and charged toward another officer, defendant Powell. Powell then began to beat King with 
his baton, knocking him to the ground. The defendant officers continued to beat King with 
batons to prevent him from getting up. For several seconds after the officers no longer con­
sidered King to be a threat, the defendant officers continued to beat King with batons and 
stomp on him. Much of the beating was caught on videotape and shown repeatedly on na­
tional news programs. Four of the officers were tried in state court, and all were acquitted of 
all charges except for one charge against defendant Koon that resulted in a hung jury. The 
announcement of the verdicts in the widely-publicized case sparked civil unrest in Los 
Angeles. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 85-88. 
82 See Koon, 518 U.S. at 89-90. For the definition of "heartland," see supra note 9. 
83. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 89-90. The other bases for departure employed by the district 
judge were the victim's misconduct that provoked the offense, the likelihood that the officers 
would lose their jobs and would be prevented from future employment in law enforcement, 
the fact that the officers had been subject to successive state and federal trials, and the low 
risk of recidivism. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 89-90. 
84. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 90. 
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Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's treatment of some of 
these bases for departure.85 In so holding, the Koon decision provided 
a useful analytical framework for evaluating the propriety of depar­
tures from the Guidelines, stating: 
If the special factor is a forbidden factor, the sentencing court cannot use 
it as a basis for departure. If the special factor is an encouraged factor, 
the court is authorized to depart if the applicable Guideline does not al­
ready take it into account. If the special factor is a discouraged factor, or 
an encouraged factor already taken into account by the applicable 
Guideline, the court should depart only if the factor is present to an ex­
ceptional degree or in some other way makes the case different from the 
ordinary case where the factor is present . . . .  If a factor is unmentioned in 
the Guidelines, the court must, after considering the "structure and theory 
of both relevant individual guidelines and the Guidelines taken as a 
whole, " . . .  decide whether it is sufficient to take the case out of the Guide­
line's heartland.86 
The Koon Court clearly emphasized that deference should be 
given to district courts in Sentencing Guidelines' departures on 
unmentioned factors, and disapproved of the district court's depar­
tures only where there was a clear abuse of discretion.87 The Court 
further stressed that courts of appeals have a limited role in the 
evaluation of unmentioned factors as potential bases for departures. 
The Court disapproved of the Ninth Circuit's categorical rejection of 
"susceptibility to prison abuse" as a factor that can serve as the basis 
for departure.88 The Court plainly stated that appellate courts could 
not determine that this particular factor was always an inappropriate 
basis for departure, since such a holding would be to "transgress the 
policymaking authority vested in the Commission."89 The Koon deci-
85. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 91. The Court held that the district court did not abuse its dis­
cretion in departing on the basis of the victim's misconduct. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 105. Fur­
thermore, the Court stated that the district court could appropriately consider susceptibility 
to abuse in prison and the successive prosecutions as factors for departure. See Koon, 518 
U.S. at 111. The Court, however, found that the district court abused its discretion in con­
sidering the career losses of the defendants, because that is clearly an expected consequence 
of the crime of violating 18 U.S.C. § 242, which prohibits a governmental authority from 
violating a person's rights. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 110. It is important to note that the Court 
concluded that the Commission must have considered this expected factor only after recog­
nizing that the district court deserved deference on this question. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 110. 
The Court also disapproved of the district court's consideration of low risk of recidivism, 
given that the Commission expressly dealt with that specific factor in the Guidelines. See 
Koon, 518 U.S. at 111. 
86. Koon, 518 U.S. at 95-96 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting United States 
v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949 (1993)). 
87. See supra note 85. 
88. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 106-09. 
89. Koon, 518 U.S. at 107 ("By urging us to hold susceptibility to abuse in prison to be 
an impermissible factor in all cases, the Government would have us reject the Commission's 
considered judgment in favor of our own."). 
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sion, therefore, emphasized the importance of the sentencing court's 
discretion in deciding whether to depart based on unmentioned fac­
tors. 
Although the Koon holding did not address expressly the circuit 
split regarding alienage as a basis for departure, the framework that 
the Koon decision implemented for departure jurisprudence speaks to 
the conflict. The Supreme Court implicitly reaffirmed the discretion­
ary approach e�bodied in Smith by approving of discretionary depar­
tures based on an unmentioned factor.90 
Ineligibility for favorable conditions of confinement due to deport­
able alien status is not mentioned in the Guidelines.91 According to 
the Koon decision, the district court must, therefore, consider the 
structure and theory of the relevant individual guidelines and the 
Guidelines as a whole to determine whether it is sufficient to take the 
case out of the heartland.92 The Supreme Court noted that this is a 
fact-specific inquiry that district judges are better situated to resolve 
than appellate judges.93 The discretionary approach properly ac­
knowledges this fact by giving the district judge discretion to deter­
mine whether or not the consequences of a defendant's status as a de­
portable alien based on conditions of his confinement could be an 
appropriate basis for departure in that particular case.94 In short, the 
discretionary approach refuses to categorically prohibit departures 
based on an alien's ineligibility for prerelease confinement programs.95 
This discretionary approach recognizes the limited role of appellate 
courts in departure jurisprudence, as envisioned by the Koon decision. 
It allows sentencing judges to determine whether or not a factor is 
present that the Commission did not consider adequately and that 
takes the case out of the heartland, without intrusive review from ap­
pellate courts unfamiliar with the facts of each case. The Koon deci­
sion, therefore, indicates the Supreme Court's implicit approval of the 
discretionary approach to departure jurisprudence that would allow 
downward departures on the basis of alienage in limited circum­
stances. 
90. See supra text accompanying notes 86-89. 
91. See generally USSG (1998); United States v. Romero, No. Crim. 97-388(JBS), 1998 
WL 690010, at *15 (D.NJ. Sept. 25, 1998) (noting that "a deportable alien's ineligibility for 
pre-release confinement under § 3624(c) is not mentioned in the Guidelines • . . .  "), reversed 
in table by United States v. Romero 193 F.3d 515 (1999). 
92 See supra text accompanying notes 86-89. 
93. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 98-99 (noting that "[d)istrict courts have an institutional ad­
vantage over appellate courts in making these sorts of determinations, especially as they see 
so many more Guidelines cases than appellate courts do"). 
94. See United States v. Smith, 27 F.3d 649, 655-56 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (concluding that "a 
downward departure may be appropriate where the defendant's status as a deportable alien 
is likely to cause a fortuitous increase in the severity of his sentence . . . .  "). 
95. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 655-56. 
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In contrast to the Smith court's discretionary approach, the 
Restrepo decision holds that downward departures on the basis of an 
alien defendant's likely ineligibility for prerelease programs under sec­
tion 3624 are inappropriate.96 This categorical prohibition of an 
unmentioned factor is erroneous in the wake of Koon. Koon teaches 
that an appellate court should allow district courts discretion in de­
tennining whether a factor (other than a prohibited factor) present in 
a given case takes the case outside of the "heartland" of Guidelines 
cases.97 For an appellate court to rule that ineligibility of aliens for a 
section 3624 prerelease program never takes a case out of the heart­
land is inappropriate in light of the Koon Court's statement that such 
a categorical prohibition would be an usurpation of the Commission's 
authority.98 
Many federal courts have disagreed with the foregoing interpreta­
tion of Koon's impact in the context of departures for the conditions 
of confinement faced by deportable aliens. Most of these courts have 
simply adhered to the categorical Restrepo approach without discuss­
ing the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Koon.99 At least 
one federal district court has gone further, expressly declaring that 
Koon does not overrule Restrepo. In United States v. Holguin, the 
court held that Restrepo was good law, despite the Koon holding.100 In 
a footnote, the court addressed the tension between the cases: 
First, Koon does not discuss the precise factor of deportable alien status 
at all. Second, Koon merely gives the district courts a framework within 
which to consider factors not specifically mentioned in the Sentencing 
Guidelines. The holding in Koon does not go so far as to implicitly over­
rule decisions like that in Restrepo. Rather, Koon reminds district courts 
of their discretion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) to depart only if "the 
court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of 
a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the 
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result 
in a sentence different from that described."101 
The two arguments advanced by the Holguin court are deficient. 
First, the fact that Koon did not deal specifically with deportable alien 
96. See United States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640, 644 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[W]e conclude that 
none of the bases relied upon by the district court, i.e., (1) the unavailability of preferred 
conditions of confinement . . .  justified the departure."); see also Romero, 1998 WL 690010, 
at *15 ("Restrepo ruled out the prospect of a downward departure based solely upon an 
alien's typical ineligibility for pre-release confinement . . . . "). 
97. See supra note 86 and accompanying text 
98. See supra note 89 and accompanying text 
99. See, e.g., Martin-Camacho v. United States, No. 96 CR 0475(SJ), 1998 WL 352313, at 
*2 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 1998); Tsang v. United States, No. 97 CIV. l886(CSH), 1997 WL 
630182, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1997). 
100. See United States v. Holguin, 16 F. Supp. 595, 600 (D. Md. 1998). 
101. Holguin, 16 F. Supp. at 600 n.2 (quoting Koon, 518 U.S. at 92 (citing § 3553(b))). 
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status is irrelevant. The Supreme Court did not limit its analysis to the 
specific factors involved in the Koon case. Quite the contrary, the de­
cision clearly stated that no factor is ruled out unless the Guidelines 
specifically prohibit consideration of the factor.102 Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court carefully described a procedure for considering 
unmentioned factors, which demonstrates the Court's acute awareness 
that the opinion would be used as a guide for the consideration of 
other unmentioned factors that might later become the subject of de­
parture jurisprudence. 
The second argument of the Holguin court is equally unpersuasive. 
Simply put, the Koon decision does not "merely" provide a framework 
for district courts to consider unmentioned factors. Rather, the Koon 
opinion goes further by discussing the limited role of appellate courts 
in reviewing district court departure decisions.103 The Holguin court 
apparently overlooked the Supreme Court's declaration that no factor 
may be categorically ruled out by an appellate court, except for the 
factors expressly prohibited by the Commission.104 
Less creative federal courts have simply declared that compara­
tively harsh conditions of confinement due to alien status is an inap­
propriate basis for departure, relying on the Restrepo precedent, and 
ignoring the effect of the Koon decision.105 For example, the Fourth 
Circuit's opinion in United States v. Gregory, decided after Koon, 
adopted a categorical rule that "illegal alien status, alone, is an inap­
propriate basis for departure."106 These courts erroneously deny dis­
trict courts the discretion to determine, under the facts of their indi­
vidual cases, whether or not that factor may be an appropriate basis 
for departure. According to Koon, such a denial of discretion is im­
proper and counterproductive.107 Only those district courts that care­
fully consider the structure and theory of the Guidelines can appropri-
102 See Koon, 518 U.S. at 109 ("We conclude, then, that a federal court's examination 
of whether a factor can ever be an appropriate basis for departure is limited to determining 
whether the Commission has proscribed, as a categorical matter, consideration of the factor. 
If the answer to the question is no - as it will be most of the time - the sentencing court 
must determine whether the factor, as occurring in the particular circumstances, takes the 
case outside the heartland of the applicable Guideline."). 
103. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 98. In fact, there is an entire section of the opinion devoted 
to the general standard of appellate review for departure determinations. See Koon, 518 
U.S. at 96-100. 
104. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
105. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
10 6. United States v. Gregory, No. 97-4090, 1998 WL 390176, at *6 (4th Cir. June 23, 
1998} (rejecting, without any explanation other than a cite to Restrepo, the defendant's ar­
gument that he should get a downward departure since he will be incarcerated in a maxi­
mum security facility and ineligible for community confinement due to his alien status). 
107. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 98 (noting the "institutional advantage" of district courts in 
making the determination of whether a factor is present in "some unusual or exceptional 
way"). 
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ately deny a departure on the basis of alien status and its impact on 
confinement.108 To the extent that any federal appellate court claims 
to exclude categorically, as a basis for departure, any factor that has 
not been prohibited from consideration by the Guidelines, such as al­
ienage,109 that court's decision is irreconcilable with Koon, and is 
therefore unsound. 
B. The 1998 Amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines 
A 1998 amendment to the commentary to section 5K2.0 of the 
Guidelines, which expressly incorporates the Koon holding, demon­
strates that both the U.S. Sentencing Commission and Congress have 
embraced the discretionary approach. The new amendment reads, in 
pertinent part: 
The United States Supreme Court has determined that, in reviewing a 
district court's decision to depart from the guidelines, appellate courts 
are to apply an abuse of discretion standard, because the decision to de­
part embodies the traditional exercise of discretion by the sentencing 
court. Koon v. United States . . . . "[To determine whether a case falls 
outside of the heartland,] the district court must make a refined assess­
ment of the many facts bearing on the outcome, informed by its vantage 
point and day-to-day experience in criminal sentencing. Whether a given 
factor is present to a degree not adequately considered by the Commis­
sion . . .  [is a matter] determined in large part by comparison with the 
facts of other Guidelines cases. District Courts have an institutional ad­
vantage over appellate courts in making these sorts of determinations, 
especially as they see so many more Guidelines cases than appellate 
courts do."110 
This amendment quotes extensively the key language from the Koon 
case. The amendment makes clear the Sentencing Commission's 
adoption of the Koon holding and its approval of the limited role for 
appellate courts in departure jurisprudence described in the court's 
opinion. No courts considering the types of departures at issue in this 
Note have discussed the effect of the new amendment to the Guide­
lines. Presumably, however, courts like the Fourth Circuit in Gregory 
and the District Court for the District of Maryland in Holguin would 
not change their decisions, since they do not see Koon as a barrier to 
categorical rejection of alienage as a basis for departure.111 If, as the 
Holguin court argues, Koon does not implicitly overrule Restrepo, 
then there is no reason to think that the amendment does either. 
108. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
109. Alienage is not one of the few factors prohibited as a basis for departure by the 
Guidelines. See supra note 8. 
110. USSG § 5K2.0 cmt. (1998) (quoting Koon, 518 U.S. at 98). 
111. See supra notes 100-101, 106 and accompanying text. 
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If, as this Note has argued, the Koon decision implicitly overrules 
Restrepo, then the amendment to the Guidelines places the Commis­
sion's stamp of approval on the discretionary approach. After the 
amendment, any courts that continue to follow Restrepo's categorical 
proscription of an alien's ineligibility for prerelease programs as a ba­
sis for departure would not only ignore Supreme Court precedent, but 
will also ignore the express will of the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
and Congress, as expressed in the new amendment. 
III. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ALLOWING DEPARTURE ON THE 
BASIS OF ALIENAGE 
Part ill argues that the independent policy goals of equal punish­
ment and trial court discretion justify departures on the basis of alien­
age in anticipation of harsh conditions of confinement. Section III.A 
shows that such departures ensure that aliens are treated the same as 
other inmates. Section ID.B argues that trial courts should be given 
more discretion to fashion appropriate sentences for individual defen­
dants - including granting departures on the basis of alienage. 
A. Equal Treatment for Alien Defendants 
Allowing for downward departures to compensate illegal aliens for 
facing objectively more severe conditions of confinement results in 
equal treatment of citizen and alien defendants who are otherwise 
similarly situated. The Bureau of Prisons' Policy Statement contains 
special requirements, applicable only to aliens, that must be met in or­
der to gain eligibility for minimum security or community confine­
ment.112 As a result, most alien defendants will face objectively 
harsher conditions of confinement than a comparable citizen defen­
dant, based on their alienage.113 An approach to sentencing that al-
112 See supra note 13. 
113. See supra notes 13, 23 and accompanying text. It is important to note, however, 
that it may be difficult, in some cases, to identify alienage as the factor that actually caused 
the increased severity of confinement conditions. Since there are a number of variables in 
the Bureau's determination of placement of an inmate, it will often be difficult to isolate the 
alienage variable as the cause of the disparity. In the words of the Smith court, "in trying to 
assess whether deportable alien status per se will really affect assignment, it may be hard to 
identify an otherwise identical citizen to serve as a benchmark." United States v. Smith, 27 
F.3d 649, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The Smith court, however, went on to note that, under some 
circumstances, the effect of the alienage factor is clear: 
[I]f a deportable alien is assigned to a more drastic prison than otherwise solely because his 
escape would have the extra consequence of defeating his deportation, then the defendant's 
status as a deportable alien would have clearly generated increased severity and thus might 
be the proper subject of a departure. 
Smith, 27 F3d at 655. Thus, in cases like Peter Bakeas's, there is little question that a simi­
larly-situated citizen "benchmark" would have been treated differently. The only factor that 
would have caused the difference in the Bureau's placement of Bakeas and the hypothetical 
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lows a trial judge sufficient discretion to counteract this disparity in 
certain cases would serve to balance the severity of punishment on 
otherwise similarly situated alien and citizen defendants.114 This bal­
ancing is desirable, because the idea of equal treatment for similarly 
situated defendants was central to the creation of a uniform system of 
sentencing guidelines.115 The desirability of equal punishment for ali­
ens and citizens is underscored by criminal law. As one judge and 
scholar has noted, "[i]ndeed, it is a crime to punish an alien differently 
than a citizen merely because of alienage."116 
Critics of departure for alienage will respond by arguing that a de­
parture does exactly that - it unjustifiably punishes an alien differ­
ently than a citizen solely on the basis of alienage. These critics claim 
that departing on the basis of alienage will cause the alien to receive a 
citizen defendant was alien status. It is in cases like these that the Smith court thought de­
partures would be necessary, but the court recognized that these type of cases might be 
"quite rare." Smith, 27 F3d at 655. Cf United States v. DeBeir, 186 F3d 561 (4th Cir. 
1999}, discussed supra note 68. 
114. For an analysis of the validity of such "anticipatory" offsetting departures, see su­
pra Section I.E. 
115. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(l}(B) (1994} (charging the U.S. Sentencing Commission to 
achieve "certainty and fairness" through a reduction in "unwarranted sentencing dispari­
ties"); USSG, ch. 1, pt. A, intro. cmt., at 1-2 (Nov. 1993) (stating Congress's goals as includ­
ing proportionality for "similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders."). See also 
Bruce M Selya & John C. Massaro, The Illustrative Role of Substantial Assistance Depar­
tures in Combatting Ultra-Uniformity, 35 B.C. L. REV. 799, 800-01 (1994} (describing the 
"thinking," including uniformity concerns, that motivated the promulgation and adoption of 
the Guidelines); Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination of Emerging Depar­
ture Jurisprudence Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 3-5 
(1991} (noting the goal of eliminating discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and other 
variables as one of the objectives of the Guidelines). 
116. Arthur L. Burnett Sr., National Origin and Ethnicity in Sentencing, 9 CRIM. JUST., 
Fall 1994, at 28 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994)). Section 242 states, in relevant part: 
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects 
any person . . .  to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being 
an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both . . . .  
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994). In addition to this criminal violation, it appears that such differential 
punishment is a violation of an alien's Constitutional rights. See supra note 75. The key 
point here is that the different punishment cannot be assessed solely on the basis of alienage. 
If, however, a noncitizen's alienage is otherwise relevant in determining an appropriate 
sentence, then the punishment would not be based purely on alien status. For example, a 
Columbian drug smuggler justifiably may be treated differently because of his connection to 
Columbia in a case where he is shown to have been involved in drug smuggling operations 
and repeat violent offenses in Columbia. There, the basis for a sentencing enhancement 
would not be simply alien status, but rather an attempt "to incapacitate drug smuggling 
operations and to deter drug smugglers from sending violent criminals to the United States." 
Burnett, supra, at 28 (describing the facts of United States v. Escobar, 803 F. Supp. 611 
(E.D.N.Y. 1992)). Another example of when aliens can be treated differently is when their 
alienage relates directly to their culpability, as when the alien is convicted of illegal reentry 
into the United States. See supra note 25 and infra note 124. 
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more lenient sentence than a citizen simply because of his or her status 
as an alien.117 
This argument, however, focuses too narrowly on the isolated deci­
sion to depart by the sentencing judge. It fails to take notice of the 
disparity that is caused by a different, later decision - the one that is 
guided by the Bureau of Prisons. The Bureau's policy is to treat aliens 
differently than citizen defendants. Therefore, the truly equal treat­
ment of aliens and citizens can be accomplished only by taking alien­
age into consideration at another step in the punishment process -
namely, the sentencing decision. Thus, the sentencing judge's decision 
offsets the Bureau's later unequal treatment, resulting in more equal 
punishment overall.118 In light of this equalizing effect, the argument 
that a departure would unfairly treat aliens differently is short-sighted. 
A second response to the equal punishment justification for depar­
tures, similar to those employed in Smith, is that alienage is not an ir­
relevant factor. Proponents of this argument maintain that a defen­
dant's status as an alien is an important consideration in determining 
the appropriate punishment for the defendant.119 This implies that the 
Bureau of Prisons is justified in creating the difficult requirements for 
alien defendants to become eligible for preferred conditions of con­
finement. 
The most likely justification for such disparate treatment is that the 
Bureau suspects that many aliens are escape threats, due to the depor­
tation that awaits most alien prisoners at the end of their sentence.120 
The Bureau may consider that the escape of an alien defendant would 
have the additional consequence of defeating his deportation. In light 
of this concern, alienage would not seem to be irrelevant in determin­
ing eligibility for minimum security or community confinement. 
There are three problems with this reasoning. First, courts should 
recognize that the Bureau is simply using alien status as a proxy for 
117. See United States v. Onwuemene, 933 F.2d 650, 651 (8th Cir. 1991) (characterizing 
a downward departure on the basis of alienage in anticipation of harsh confinement condi­
tions as "sentencing an offender on the basis of [alienage]" in violation of the Constitutional 
prohibitions described supra note 76). 
118. Of course, the sentence of the citizen defendant and the alien defendant who re­
ceives a departure will not be identical. They will simply be "more equal" than they would 
be without a departure. In some cases the departure will give the alien what appears to be a 
lesser sentence than what a citizen defendant would have received. In other cases, however, 
the departure may not be sufficient to fully offset the harsh effects. In Bakeas, for example, 
the sentencing judge thought that the home confinement would still be harsher than what a 
citizen defendant would have received, but noted that "it is as close as the current Bureau of 
Prisons policy allows me to come in implementing the sentence the guidelines envisioned for 
this crime and this offender." United States v. Bakeas, 987 F. Supp. 44, 51-52 (D. Mass. 
1997). 
119. See United States v. Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640, 644 (2d Cir. 1993). 
120. See Smith, 27 F.3d at 655 (noting that the three requirements listed in the Bureau's 
Program Statement, see supra note 13, "suggestO that ineligibility stems primarily from the 
greater likelihood of escape"). 
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the variables that are actually relevant, and so alienage will not corre­
spond perfectly with the risk of escape.121 Second, even if aliens are 
more likely than citizens to be escape threats, that reasoning only jus­
tifies keeping alien prisoners out of lower security confinement pro­
grams; it does not go so far as to justify a categorical rejection of 
Smith-type departures. Allowing a judge to depart in some cases to 
counteract the harsh conditions disparity caused by the Bureau will 
not necessarily undo any escape-prevention effect that is intended and 
justified. Generally, if a departure is granted, the alien prisoner will 
still serve his entire sentence in higher security conditions, but the 
overall length of the incarceration would be decreased to compensate 
the prisoner.122 The risk of escape, and the resultant defeat of deporta­
tion, is still kept to a minimum, but the alien defendant will not serve 
an objectively harsher sentence to accomplish this goal. 
A third flaw in this reasoning is that it ignores the limitations on 
departures due to alienage. According to the departure scheme de­
vised by the Smith court and advocated by this Note, departures would 
only be appropriate when there is no connection between the defen­
dant's alienage and the blameworthiness of the defendant.123 The 
Smith court stated: "[A]s the defendant's status as a deportable alien 
is by no means necessarily unrelated to his just des[s]erts, even a court 
confident that the status will lead to worse conditions should depart 
only when persuaded that the greater severity is undeserved."124 Thus, 
when the defendant's status is relevant to his punishment, such as 
when he is convicted of illegal reentry into the United States, the 
121. As the Smith court notes, it may be appropriate to take the Bureau's three consid­
erations (family or community ties, stable employment, and five years of residence in the 
U.S.) into account, given their effect on flight risk. Using alien status as a proxy for these 
factors, however, may cause an alien to be assigned to "a more drastic prison than otherwise 
solely because his escape would have the extra consequence of defeating his deportation.'' 
Smith, 27 F3d at 655. In such a case, a departure may be appropriate. See id. 
122. Although the Smith and Restrepo courts do not acknowledge explicitly that a de­
parture would likely affect the length of the confinement, not the conditions, this notion 
seems to underlie the reasoning employed by both courts. The Bakeas case described in the 
Introduction differs from this norm, in that the judge's departure allowed Mr. Bakeas to be 
placed in home confinement, rather than just shortening his stay in a medium security 
prison. See Bakeas, 9'01 F. Supp. at 51. 
123. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. 
124. Smith, 27 F.3d at 655. It is clear, for instance, that a court should not depart to off­
set harsh conditions when the alien has been convicted of illegal reentry into the United 
States. Such a defendant would present a flight risk, since he has tried to defeat deportation 
before, and may be likely to do so again. Courts consistently have distinguished these cases 
from Smith, however, and have denied departures. See United States v. Gonzalez-Portillo, 
121 F.3d 1122, 1124-25 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Because deportable alien status is an inherent ele­
ment of the crimeO • . .  this factor was clearly 'taken into consideration by the Sentencing 
Commission in formulating the guidelineO' . . .  and was accounted for in the offense level it 
established . . . . In [Smith], however, the defendant had been sentenced under a guideline 
that did not already take his deportability into consideration.'' (citation omitted)); United 
States v. Ebolum, 72 F.3d 35, 38 (6th Cir. 1995) (using a similar analysis). 
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Commission likely will have considered alien status, and a departure 
on that basis would be inappropriate. 
B. Trial Court Discretion in Fashioning Sentences 
A categorical approach, like the one employed in Restrepo, that 
prohibits sentencing judges from departing based on an alien defen­
dant's likelihood of facing harsher conditions of confinement, creates 
limitations on the discretion of trial courts that would decrease the 
quality of sentencing results. Such restrictive appellate court review of 
sentencing decisions precludes trial judges from tailoring sentences 
appropriately to individual crimes and individual defendants.125 
An appellate court ruling that prevents district courts from de­
parting on the basis of alienage where the alien defendant faces 
harsher conditions of confinement would replace the trial court's 
sound exercise of discretion with the categorical view that such a cir­
cumstance can never justify a departure from the Guidelines. Such a 
view is not only contrary to what Congress and the Sentencing Com­
mission intended,126 and contrary to what the Supreme Court has an­
nounced regarding departure jurisprudence in Koon, 127 but also tends 
to lead to sentences that are not narrowly-tailored to fit the defen­
dant's crime and circumstances. 
A trial court has several advantages in determining whether or not 
to depart. First, the trial court is familiar with the specific facts of each 
case, whereas the circuit court only has access to the official record.128 
Second, the trial court judges see many more Guidelines cases than 
their appellate counterparts. Third, trial courts hear more ordinary 
cases, while the appellate courts are likely to hear mostly atypical 
cases, since those are the ones that generally will present issues for ap­
peal.129 These factors make the trial court better at determining 
whether or not the factors involved in a specific case are sufficiently 
unique, or are present to a sufficient degree, to take the case outside 
125. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 97 (1996) ("Congress did not intend, by es­
tablishing limited appellate review, to vest in appellate courts wide-ranging authority over 
district court sentencing decisions."); see also Gregory N. Racz, Note, Exploring Collateral 
Consequences: Koon v. United States, Third Party Hann, and Departures from Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1462, 1470-71 (1997) (noting Koon's rejection of a 
de novo standard of review due to a need to give "substantial deference to the district court's 
application of the Guidelines to the facts of each case"). 
126. See supra Part I. 
127. See supra Part II. 
128. See Racz, supra note 125, at 1470-71 ("As one appellate judge stated: 'We do not 
see or hear the witnesses or the defendant . . . .  We do not see real people in their struggle to 
live, only abstract people - 'plaintiffs' and 'defendants,' 'appellants' and 'appellees,' 'peti­
tioners' and 'respondents.' ' ") (quoting United States v. Brewer, 899 F.2d 503, 514 (6th Cir. 
1990) (Merritt, C.J., dissenting)). 
129. See United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 951 (1st Cir. 1993). 
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the "heartland" of Guidelines cases.130 That is, the trial court is in a 
much better position to make case-specific determinations regarding 
the validity of departures from the Guidelines.131 As the Supreme 
Court stated in Koon, and at least one circuit court has also noted, the 
decision whether or not a case is within the "heartland" is exactly the 
kind of determination that trial courts have an advantage over appel­
late courts in making.132 
A common response to calls for more trial court discretion in de­
partures from the guidelines is that such a course would return the 
sentencing process to the relative chaos that inspired the formulation 
and adoption of the Sentencing Guidelines.133 This response, however 
persuasive it may be in regard to departures generally, overlooks the 
limitations on a trial court's discretion to grant this type of departure. 
Specifically, the limitations enumerated by the Smith court and advo­
cated by this Note will ensure that such departures are granted only in 
"unusual" cases, thus preserving the desired uniformity of the Guide­
lines.134 These limitations will serve as guidance to the lower courts, 
rather than a broad categorical appellate pronouncement that this 
specific type of departure is never warranted.135 These limits serve to 
keep the number of departures based on conditions of confinement 
relatively low. Indeed, the framework outlined by the Smith opinion 
would not defeat the uniformity goal of the Guidelines, but rather 
130. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 98 (1996). But see Barry L. Johnson, Discretion and the Rule 
of Law in Federal Guidelines Sentencing: Developing Departure Jurisprudence in the Wake 
of Koon v. United States, 58 Omo STATE L.J. 1697, 1731-45 (1998) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court's reliance on the argument that trial courts have an "institutional advantage" 
was flawed). 
131. See Racz, supra note 125, at 1470 (noting that deference to the district courts 
"makes sense" in sentencing questions). 
132 See Koon, 518 U.S. at 98; Rivera, 994 F .2d at 951. 
133. See supra note 4. 
134. The D.C. Circuit held that trial courts may depart on the basis of objectively 
harsher conditions of confinement, but emphasized that those courts should only do so when 
the difference in conditions is substantial, applied for a significant part of the sentence, and 
is undeserved. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
135. It could be argued, however, that any appellate limitations on departures that are 
unmentioned in the Guidelines are actually categorical rules if you define the category more 
narrowly. For instance, one could claim that the D.C. Circuit's statement that the difference 
in conditions should be undeserved is a categorical rule against downward departures for 
aliens who will be confined under harsher conditions, but whose alien status causes them to 
deserve a harsher penalty. This, however, stretches the definition of a "factor," as used in 
the Guidelines, too far. Certainly harsh conditions of confinement are accepted as a poten­
tially relevant factor (although unmentioned in the Guidelines) for consideration, but the 
more narrow, hypothetical category described above does not seem to fit the Commission's 
view of a "factor," given the factors that the Commission actually mentions in the Guide­
lines, such as having been abused as a child or vulnerability to attack in prison. 
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would "fulfil the Guidelines' command that such departures will be 
'highly infrequent.' m36 
Restrepo represented a categorical declaration that harsh condi­
tions of confinement based on the fortuity of alien status could never 
take a case outside of the "heartland" of Guidelines cases.137 Such an 
approach by an appellate court negates the institutional advantages 
that make a trial court uniquely suited to make departure decisions. 
In contrast, the Smith court's discretionary approach would take ad­
vantage of those institutional efficiencies. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note has shown that appellate courts should refuse to pro­
scribe categorically, as a basis for downward departure from the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines, the fact that a defendant will face objectively 
harsher conditions of confinement based solely on the fortuity that the 
defendant is a deportable alien. Not only does such a proscription in­
trude upon the trial court's sentencing discretion, which was expressly 
preserved by the Supreme Court in Koon, but it also results in objec­
tively unequal sentences - exactly what the Guidelines were meant to 
minimize. In cases where the sentencing judge is confident that an 
alien defendant will face substantially more severe confinement condi­
tions than a similarly situated citizen, over a substantial portion of his 
sentence, and where the judge is also confident that this inequality is 
undeserved, she should have the discretion to depart downward to off­
set that undeserved severity. Punishing aliens more severely, simply 
because they are aliens, is illegal and perhaps unconstitutional. The 
Sentencing Guidelines, therefore, must be interpreted to give sen­
tencing judges the discretion to depart on the basis of alienage where 
alien status causes a fortuitous increase in the severity of the sentence. 
In light of this conclusion, Judge Gertner's decision to grant Peter 
Bakeas a downward departure was an appropriate one. 
136. United States v. Smith, 27 F.3d 649, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting USSG, ch. 1, pt. 
A, §  4(b) (1992)). 
137. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
